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WHY LEGAL WRITING IS “DOCTRINAL” 
AND MORE IMPORTANTLY PROFOUND 
Harold Anthony Lloyd* 
I. A CHALLENGE TO THE WAY WE SPEAK OF LEGAL WRITING 
I want to challenge everyone (including law professors who teach legal 
writing) to stop directly and indirectly referring to legal writing as a “non-
doctrinal” course. I want to challenge everyone (including law professors who 
teach legal writing) to avoid saying such things as, “How does the time re-
quired for students’ doctrinal course assignments compare with the time re-
quired for students’ legal writing assignments?” As long as we must use the 
word “doctrinal,” I hope we would rephrase such questions as follows: “How 
does the time required for students’ other doctrinal course assignments com-
pare with the time required for students’ legal writing assignments?” Ultimate-
ly, I hope we will dispose of the term “doctrinal” and instead speak of “mean-
ingful” courses and their “intertwined proper theory and proper practice.”1 
Why do I quibble about such syllables? I quibble because “non-doctrinal” 
in the law school context can be code for “lesser,” and can suggest that legal 
writing has lesser import than other law school courses.2 To the extent such 
code3 marks legal writing as “lesser,” it damages legal education across the 
board. It damages students and law professors not teaching legal writing by 
                                                        
*  ©2018 Harold Anthony Lloyd. I would like to thank Elon Law School for letting me 
speak about this topic on December 8, 2017, and I would also like to thank Professor Sue 
Liemer and others for encouraging me to put to paper some of what I said on that day. I am 
also grateful to Professor Laura Graham and Professor Christine Coughlin for their thoughts 
and comments. Any errors or other shortcomings are my own. 
1  By “meaningful,” I mean a course that recognizes and effectively employs the fusion of 
theory and practice that both reality and semantics require. See Harold Anthony Lloyd, The-
ory Without Practice Is Empty; Practice Without Theory Is Blind: The Inherent Inseparabil-
ity of Doctrine and Skills, in LINDA H. EDWARDS, THE DOCTRINE-SKILLS DIVIDE: LEGAL 
EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 77–90 (2017) [hereinafter Lloyd, Theory Without 
Practice]. By “intertwined proper theory and proper practice,” I would further recognize 
such required fusion of theory and practice. See id. 
2  See Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: A Doctrinal Course, 1 SAVANNAH L. REV. 1, 9–12 
(2014). This excellent article is essential reading for anyone interested in the “doctrinal” sta-
tus of legal writing. 
3  I concede at the outset that worse code words exist than “non-doctrinal.” For example, 
parsing “substantive” and “non-substantive” courses suggests “non-substantive” courses lack 
substance. Id. at 2. However, I agree with Professor Edwards that talk of legal writing as 
“non-substantive” seems on the wane because of the suggestion of “little substance,” and I 
shall not pursue that term further here. See id. at 2. 
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suggesting that legal writing, and the theory, skills, and insights taught by legal 
writing, merit less of their time.4 This, in turn, increases the odds that both stu-
dents and other faculty will remain ignorant of the critical knowledge and skills 
that legal writing teaches. It also damages law professors teaching legal writing 
because it invites disparate treatment such as lack of tenure, lower pay, and 
lack of equal respect.5 As a result, law professors teaching legal writing also 
have more difficulty in publishing scholarship,6 a difficulty which deprives us 
all of the scholarship so silenced or deterred.7 
II. LAW SCHOOL COURSES AND “DOCTRINAL” IN NON-CODED, ORDINARY 
LANGUAGE 
If we are to use “doctrinal” to parse among courses, let us, therefore, put 
aside such damaging code usage and inquire what “doctrinal” actually means in 
its standard or dictionary senses. According to The American Heritage Diction-
ary, “doctrinal” means “[c]haracterized by, belonging to, or concerning doc-
trine.”8 This definition thus incorporates “doctrine,” which has the following 
meanings with the “central and often the most commonly sought meaning” 
listed first:9 
1. A principle or body of principles presented for acceptance or belief, as by a 
religious, political, scientific, or philosophic group; dogma. 
2. A rule or principle of law, especially when established by precedent. 
3. A statement of official government policy, especially in foreign affairs and 
military strategy. 
4. Archaic Something taught; a teaching.10 
The Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary differs a bit here by includ-
ing “something that is taught”11 under the non-archaic definition of “doctrine,” 
though that sense is the oldest of the non-archaic senses.12 
                                                        
4  See id. at 9–10. 
5  See Harold Anthony Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising Langdell: The Insepa-
rability of Legal Theory, Practice, and the Humanities, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1213, 1245 
(2014) [hereinafter Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense]. 
6  See Edwards, supra note 2, at 10. 
7  The legality of such disparate treatment is beyond the scope of this paper. I would note, 
however, that legal writing has often been seen as “a woman’s job.” Ann C. McGinley, Re-
producing Gender on Law School Faculties, in EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 240 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). The reader can take it from there. 
8  Doctrinal, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2016). 
9  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY xxiv (5th ed. 2016) (“Entries containing more than 
one sense are arranged . . . with the central and often the most commonly sought meaning 
first.”). 
10  Doctrine, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2016). 
11  Doctrine, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). 
12  See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 20a (11th ed. 2014) (“The order of 
senses within an entry is historical: the sense known to have been first used in English is en-
tered first.”). 
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Taking these four definitions in turn, we can see that only two are plausible 
fits for even torts, contracts, and other law school courses that would tradition-
ally claim to be “doctrinal.” 
A. “Doctrine” in the First Sense 
The first and thus “central and often the most commonly sought” sense of 
“doctrine” (“[a] principle or body of principles presented for acceptance or be-
lief, as by a religious, political, scientific, or philosophic group; dogma”13) 
seems at best an imperfect fit because of the “dogma” language.14 Litigators do, 
of course, “present” arguments to courts that certain principles or rules should 
be accepted or followed. We also debate rules or principles in class. However, 
no lawyers or legal scholars should ever dogmatically “believe in” everything 
that purports to be law. No one, for example, should have ever “believed in” 
the principle or rule of separate but equal set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson.15 
Lawyers and scholars should instead call out injustice and bad precedent rather 
than simply “believe” in it. Additionally, to the extent the first definition might 
also construe law as some Langdellian “science” of certain rules,16 I have ad-
dressed that sort of silliness elsewhere17 and will not repeat my arguments here. 
We might attempt to avoid these “dogma” problems by going off script and 
truncating the definition to eliminate the reference to “dogma” and thereby fo-
cus more on “a principle or . . . body of principles.”18 However, I believe this 
                                                        
13  Doctrine, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 10. 
14  “Dogma” means “1. A doctrine or a corpus of doctrines relating to matters such as morali-
ty and faith, set forth in an authoritative manner by a religion. 2. A principle or statement of 
ideas, or a group of such principles or statements, especially when considered to be authori-
tative, or accepted uncritically.” Dogma, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 
2016). Such uncritical acceptance seems a fatal taint to me when applying this definition to 
the law. 
15  See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
16  As I have written before, Christopher Columbus Langdell did much damage to legal edu-
cation with his “wrong and counterintuitive notions . . . [that] law is a science of principles 
and doctrines known with certainty and primarily traced through case law.” Harold Anthony 
Lloyd, Raising the Bar, Razing Langdell, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231, 231 (2016) [herein-
after Lloyd, Raising the Bar]. 
17  See generally id. at 231–36. 
18  Professor Edwards takes this approach. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 3. She uses Merri-
am-Webster’s online definition of “doctrine” which as of February 21, 2019 reads in full as 
follows: 
1 archaic: teaching, instruction 
2 a : something that is taught 
b : a principle or position or the body of principles in a branch of knowledge or system of belief : 
dogma 
// Catholic doctrine 
c law : a principle of law established through past decisions 
d : a statement of fundamental government policy especially in international relations 
// the Truman Doctrine 
e : a military principle or set of strategies 
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would risk altering the first meaning by removing the textual context provided 
by the word “dogma.”19 Before risking this, we should explore whether other 
terms and phrases—such as “meaningful” and “intertwined proper theory and 
proper practice”20—discussed in this article prove more useful. 
B. “Doctrine” in the Second Sense 
The second presumably most “central” or “commonly sought” sense of 
“doctrine” (“[a] rule or principle of law, especially when established by prece-
dent”21) employs the term “law” and thus can, no doubt, be of at least some use. 
However, the qualifier of “especially when established by precedent” raises is-
sues. Is the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, “law” and thus “doctri-
nal” to the extent it has not been established by a judicial ruling? And what 
about statutes? How does the qualifier apply to them? Though I will try to work 
with this second sense in Part III below, we can already see that it is not a per-
fect fit even with other courses (such as Uniform Commercial Code or statutory 
courses) that would elevate themselves with the term “doctrinal.”22 
C. “Doctrine” in the Third Sense 
The third presumably most “central” or “commonly sought” sense of “doc-
trine” (“[a] statement of official government policy, especially in foreign affairs 
and military strategy”23) seems of little use here, and I shall not pursue it fur-
ther. 
D. “Doctrine” in the Fourth Sense 
This leaves us with the possibly archaic sense of “doctrine” as 
“[s]omething taught; a teaching.”24 In addition to the potential problems of us-
ing words in senses no longer used in ordinary language, this definition has an 
overbreadth problem. Since such things as alchemy, witchcraft, and even utter 
                                                                                                                                
Doctrine, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doctrine 
[https://perma.cc/L6JB-J8AB] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). Professor Edwards examines “a 
principle or position or the body of principles in a branch of knowledge or system of belief” 
without reference to “dogma.” See Edwards, supra note 2, at 3. 
19  See Harold Anthony Lloyd, Law’s “Way of Words”: Pragmatics and Textualist Error, 49 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 221, 259–60 (2016) (discussing textual context). 
20  See, e.g., Lloyd, Theory Without Practice, supra note 1; see also discussion infra Sections 
II.E, IV. 
21  Doctrine, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 10. 
22  The Uniform Commercial Code is a model code under the charge of the Uniform Law 
Commission and the American Law Institute. See 2017-2018 RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 361–
63 (Charles L. Knapp et al. eds., 2017). Statutes are, of course, products of the legislative 
and not judicial branches of government. See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN ET AL., A LAWYER 
WRITES 16 (2d ed. 2013). 
23  Doctrine, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 10. 
24  See id. 
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nonsense, for example, can be taught, such things would also fall under the title 
of “doctrinal.” 
At this point, we should have serious questions about how a “doctrinal” la-
bel could elevate any “meaningful” law school course over another. We should 
also have serious questions about whether “doctrinal” has any desirable law 
school usage given the limitations of senses one through three, the extreme 
breadth and possibly archaic nature of sense four, and the damaging code con-
notations of the term when used in the law school context. 
E. “Doctrine” Versus “Intertwined Proper Theory and Proper Practice” 
Before going further, I should note that not all people who object to the use 
of “doctrinal” to lessen the status of legal writing would agree with the scope of 
my doubts about the term “doctrinal.” For example, while Professor Linda Ed-
wards and I agree that we should not use “doctrinal” to “distinguish legal writ-
ing from other courses” and that “we should use the term often and intentional-
ly to describe Legal Writing.”25 I, for the reasons set forth in this article, would 
use the term only so long as others continue to insist on its usage. In contrast, 
Professor Edwards believes that “doctrine” has important curricular usage be-
cause “[d]octrine defines a discipline’s scholarship and therefore what counts 
as disciplinary knowledge and what does not.”26 
Given the limitations of senses one through three of “doctrine,” the ex-
treme breadth and possibly archaic nature of the fourth sense of the term, and 
the damaging code connotations of the term in the law school context, I would 
rather use a phrase involving the applicable intertwined proper theory and 
proper practice when asking what defines “scholarship” for a given course. 
Asking what is the proper intertwined theory and practice for contracts and le-
gal writing, for example, helps define course content and scholarship without 
the accompanying baggage that “doctrine” brings along. Inquiring as to proper 
intertwined theory and practice on its face considers the continuing relevance 
of current norms for a current subject matter.27 However, by asking what is 
“proper,” such a question also recognizes not only that given concepts can be 
debated but that concepts can also be framed and fleshed out in different ways 
                                                        
25  Edwards, supra note 2, at 2, 17. 
26  Id. at 10. 
27  I agree with Professor Edwards that subject matters can involve norms that one must ac-
cept or challenge and that “commonly accepted” notions are “privileged” in the sense that 
ideas already accepted in a given subject matter are more welcomed than those that are not. 
See id. at 11. I disagree, however, that we need the term “doctrine” to account for this 
“heavy thumb on the scales of knowledge development.” See id.; see also ROBERT BENSON, 
THE INTERPRETATION GAME: HOW JUDGES AND LAWYERS MAKE THE LAW 74, 79 (2008) 
(“[I]nterpretive communities” have constraints that are “subject to change” though “extreme-
ly hard to budge” and “social meanings” are “the meanings other interpreters are persuaded 
to share.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
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that we can then put to the test of experience and debate.28 “A principle or body 
of principles presented for acceptance or belief . . . ; dogma” (the first sense of 
“doctrine”29) seems less inviting: are we to take all such “doctrine” like dogma 
and accept it “uncritically?”30 
F. “Doctrinal” and Wittgenstein’s Ladder 
If it were up to me alone, I would simply dispose of the term “doctrinal.” 
Since, however, it is not up to me alone, I will, therefore, use the term “doctri-
nal” here in much the same spirit that Wittgenstein used his Tractatus: as a lad-
der to be tossed away once we have climbed it to clearer heights.31 In such a 
Wittgensteinian spirit, I shall therefore explore whether legal writing is “doctri-
nal” in the second and fourth senses of “doctrine” noted above (with the other 
senses again being of questionable or little use32). 
III. LEGAL WRITING AND THE “DOCTRINAL” IN NON-CODED, ORDINARY 
LANGUAGE 
A. “Doctrine” in the Second Sense 
Taking first, therefore, the second presumably most “central” or “common-
ly sought” meaning of “doctrine” (“[a] rule or principle of law, especially when 
established by precedent”33), legal writing more than holds its own with other 
“doctrinal” courses. At Wake Forest, for example, we have an intensive Foun-
dations Week before other courses start where legal writing is the first course to 
teach (among other things): (i) basics of stare decisis, (ii) the fundamental parts 
and basic types of judicial opinions (majority, plurality, dissent), (iii) basics of 
that troublemaker dictum, (iv) sources and hierarchies of the law (including ju-
dicial decisions), (v) the distinction between the rule of a case and the holding 
of a case, (vi) synthesizing judicial rules, (vii) distinguishing between elements 
and factors in judicial decisions, (viii) jurisdiction basics, and (ix) how to brief 
a case.34 As legal writing continues at Wake Forest, legal writing, among other 
things: (x) continues to flesh out the above, (xi) explores case illustrations and 
                                                        
28  See Harold Anthony Lloyd, Good Legal Thought: What Wordsworth Can Teach Langdell 
About Forms, Frames, Choices, and Aims, 41 VT. L. REV. 1, 7–12 (2016) [hereinafter Lloyd, 
Wordsworth] (on framing); Harold Anthony Lloyd, Law as Trope: Framing and Evaluating 
Conceptual Metaphors, 37 PACE L. REV. 89, 102–07 (2016) (on experience and workability). 
29  Doctrine, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 10. 
30  Dogma, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 14. 
31  See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 74 (D.F. Pears & B.F. 
McGuinness, trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978) (One must “throw away the ladder after 
he has climbed up it,” and one “must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the 
world aright.”). 
32  See supra Sections II.A, II.C. 
33  Doctrine, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 10. 
34  Syllabi on file with author; see also COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 15–73. 
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their parts, (xii) teaches canons of construction, and (xiii) examines and applies 
analogical reasoning and counter-analyses in common law contexts.35 Legal 
writing is thus undoubtedly “doctrinal” in the sense of teaching legal rules or 
principles, especially those formed by precedent. 
B. “Doctrine” in the Fourth Sense 
Taking next the fourth, and possibly archaic, meaning of “doctrine” as 
“something taught,”36 no reasonable person would maintain that legal writing is 
not “something taught.” Rather than defend the obvious here, I shall instead 
survey more of legal writing’s “something taught.” 
In addition to the crucial matters discussed above, legal writing also ex-
plores the interpretation, construction, and application of statutes.37 This adds 
critical depth to legal curriculums caught up in Langdell’s obsession with re-
dacted appellate cases.38 Additionally, legal writing teaches basic forms of 
good thought (IRAC, CREAC, and RIRAC, for example39) as well as when and 
how to vary them.40 What can be more central to legal scholarship than that? 
Legal writing teaches both objective and persuasive thought and writing.41 
What can be more central to legal scholarship than that? Legal writing teaches 
students how to find, understand, and apply law and arguments.42 What can be 
more central to legal scholarship than that? Legal writing also teaches rules of 
civil and appellate procedure—especially as it moves into persuasive writing.43 
What can be more central to legal scholarship than that? 
Though it might seem impossible for a single course to teach even more, 
legal writing indeed teaches more—much more. Legal writing teaches rhetoric 
in the classical sense. It teaches at least two of the three branches of rhetoric: 
the deliberative (objective and persuasive writing as to future action) and the 
judicial (objective and persuasive writing as to past action).44 Legal writing also 
teaches at least four of the five parts of classical rhetoric: Invention, Arrange-
                                                        
35  Syllabi on file with author; see also COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 15–162. 
36  Doctrine, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 10. 
37  Syllabi on file with author; see also COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 38–43, 181–97. 
38  See generally Lloyd, Raising the Bar, supra note 16, at 231–37. 
39  Syllabi on file with author; see also COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 81–85. For 
“RIRAC,” see generally Lloyd, Wordsworth, supra note 28, at 13–15. 
40  See Lloyd, Wordsworth, supra note 28, at 15–16. 
41  See generally COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22; JOAN M. ROCKLIN ET AL., AN ADVOCATE 
PERSUADES (2016). 
42  See COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 57–66, 129–65. 
43  See generally ROCKLIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 49–59, 75–98. 
44  See generally COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 3 (as to objective writing); RICHARD A. 
LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 164 (2d ed. 1991) (setting out the three 
branches of Rhetoric); ROCKLIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 3 (as to persuasive writing). 
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ment, Style, and Delivery.45 Legal writing, additionally, explores the two types 
of proof: the deductive and inductive.46 In my first-year legal writing course, I 
also like to combine the two types of proof with an overview of fallacious rea-
soning. What other law school course does all of this? “Doctrinal” legal writing 
as “something taught” thus holds its own against any other “doctrinal” course 
we commonly see in law school today. 
Were all this coverage and depth not amazing enough, legal writing can 
boast of even more. To the misguided contracts professor47 who, for example, 
considers legal writing “non-doctrinal” or “something lesser,” I would point out 
the following contract assignments in my first-year objective legal writing 
class. I typically assign as my first “major” assignment an actual commercial 
lease for the students to read and have them determine whether it contains an 
implied covenant of continuous operations. The students’ work here is deeper 
than any implied covenant exam question I could imagine in a Commercial 
Leasing or Contracts class. I also teach Commercial Leasing and do not give 
exams because of my belief in their often superficial nature. Instead, I require 
students to demonstrate knowledge and skill through the drafting of lease and 
lease-related documents. For the second “major” assignment, I typically assign 
a note and deed of trust for students to read. I then have them write an objective 
memo on whether the trustee will prevail at her foreclosure hearing and wheth-
er injunctive relief is available to the debtor in a separate hearing under the par-
ticular facts I give my students to parse. Once more, I find it hard to imagine an 
exam question in other “doctrinal” courses (such as Remedies or Debtor-
Creditor Law) which could explore such questions in such depth. For my third 
“major” assignment, I typically require an objective memo on whether a restric-
tive covenant is valid in a complex amended employment agreement which the 
students must also read. This also requires delving into the real world of stat-
utes and unredacted appellate cases that transcend what is simply given in any 
textbook of redacted cases. Again, it is unlikely that an exam question in anoth-
er “doctrinal” course (such as Remedies or Employment Law, for example) 
could match the intellectual rigor this exercise requires. I have no doubt that 
others who teach legal writing can speak of similar or even more rigorous ex-
                                                        
45  See generally COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22 (as to objective writing); LANHAM, supra 
note 44, at 165 (setting out the five parts of rhetoric); see also ROCKLIN ET AL., supra note 41 
(as to persuasive writing). I also try to talk to students about the fifth part: Memory. 
46  See generally LANHAM, supra note 44, at 166 (describing induction and deduction as the 
two types of “logical proof”); see also ROCKLIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 7–9 (as to “logos”). 
47  I select a misguided contracts professor here because Langdell’s first case book was on 
contracts. See generally C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
(1871). Far from disliking contracts professors, I long for the day when first year contracts 
professors will bravely abandon obsessions with redacted appellate cases and teach instead 
from real contracts, hornbooks, restatements, model codes, hypotheticals, and simulations in 
ways that add more depth and intellectual rigor to the classroom. See Lloyd, Exercising 
Common Sense, supra note 5, at 1236–37. 
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amples of how their legal writing problems surpass the requirements of ex-
ams.48 
IV. THE FURTHER PROFUNDITY OF LEGAL WRITING APART FROM LABELS AND 
CODED LANGUAGE 
Of course, the high status of legal writing does not depend upon how dic-
tionaries define the word “doctrinal.” In addition to the profound scope of legal 
writing discussed above, basic principles of semantics and modern cognitive 
psychology further underscore the profundity of legal writing.49 
Regardless of how one defines “doctrinal,” one understands concepts more 
deeply when one understands how concepts play out in the world of experi-
ence.50 As I have written on this in detail elsewhere,51 I shall merely reiterate 
here some examples from above. One would no doubt better understand a 
commercial lease and any implied covenants of continuous operations when 
one understands how they play out in actual experience. One would no doubt 
better understand deeds of trust when one understands how they play out in ac-
tual experience. One would no doubt better understand restrictive covenants in 
employment contracts when one understands how they play out in experience. 
Turning to public law examples, I, no doubt, better understand a statute the 
more I understand how it plays out in experience. If someone asks me what a 
statute means, I will flesh it out (note this bodily reference) by describing how 
it plays out in experience. Such “fleshing out” is at the heart of the skills taught 
in legal writing where students must produce actual objective and persuasive 
written and oral products required of practicing lawyers.52 Such “fleshing out” 
is also at the heart of meaning. Though I will not debate various theories of 
meaning here,53 the above examples of “fleshing out” meaning demonstrate 
that any plausible theory of meaning must involve how notions play out in ex-
perience.54 In any reasonable semantics, legal writing must, therefore, be a pro-
foundly meaningful course. 
Focusing on “fleshing out” also accords with insights of modern cognitive 
psychology that legal writing also embodies.55 These insights recognize that we 
do not take a purely objective or canonical approach when exploring how con-
                                                        
48  See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 2, at 5. 
49  See Lloyd, Theory Without Practice, supra note 1, at 79–85 (exploring workable theories 
of meaning and modern cognitive research on embodied meaning theory). 
50  Id. at 79, 83. 
51  See generally id. 
52  See id. at 79–80. 
53  See, e.g., Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense, supra note 5, at 1216–18, 1250–54 (explor-
ing various theories of meaning). 
54  See generally Lloyd, Theory Without Practice, supra note 1. 
55  Id. at 80. 
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cepts play out in experience.56 Instead, we do it from the “perspective of some-
one actually experiencing the scene.”57 In other words, meaning is embodied; 
as George Lakoff puts it, language can only become meaningful through our 
“sensory-motor and emotional systems, which define goals and imagine, rec-
ognize, and carry out actions.”58 Thus, studies have shown that bowlers per-
formed better when they had practiced by visualizing proper bowling tech-
niques, while visualizing bad techniques had reverse results.59 And, of course, 
the absence of visualizing techniques is by definition (to me at least) just emp-
ty. 
In accordance with such principles of modern cognitive psychology, legal 
writing both visualizes concepts (such as the issues, rules, ways of applying the 
rules, and resulting conclusion)60 and puts such visualizations into actual prac-
tice through the writings and other exercises required in legal writing.61 This is 
best intellectual practices in full accord with the principles of modern cognitive 
psychology discussed above. Rather than diminishing legal writing, this ele-
vates legal writing’s status for those who actually understand how the mind and 
meaning work. 
CONCLUSION: LEGAL WRITING AND ODD NOTIONS THAT PRACTICE TAINTS 
SCHOLARSHIP 
Consistent with the foregoing, we should call out the odd Langdellian no-
tion that practice experience taints scholarship.62 As a part of this, we should 
also reject the disparate and disparaging treatment of professors with practice 
experience who teach legal writing or other subjects.63 The legality of this form 
of disparate treatment is beyond the scope of this paper. I leave it to the reader 
to picture the spectacle of a lawyer arguing to a jury that a legal writing or clin-
ical professor over forty years of age with many years of practice experience is 
less qualified to teach law and deserves substantially less pay and fewer voting 
rights than a much younger “doctrinal” professor who has never practiced law.
Professors who teach legal writing should help lead this charge both directly 
and indirectly. Once more, as long as we must use the term “doctrinal,” law 
professors who teach legal writing (and all others) should refuse to say such 
things as “How does the time required for students’ doctrinal course assign-
ments compare with the time required for students’ legal writing assignments?” 
                                                        
56  See BENJAMIN K. BERGEN, LOUDER THAN WORDS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HOW THE MIND 
MAKES MEANING 71 (2012). 
57  See id. 
58  George Lakoff, Foreword to BERGEN, supra note 56, at x. 
59  See BERGEN, supra note 56, at 25. 
60  See Lloyd, Wordsworth, supra note 28, at 8–13. 
61  See generally COUGHLIN, supra note 22 (on objective legal writing); ROCKLIN, supra note 
41 (on persuasive legal writing). 
62  See Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense, supra note 5, at 1239. 
63  See id. at 1245. 
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Instead, they should say such things as: “How does the time required for stu-
dents’ other doctrinal course assignments compare with the time required for 
students’ legal writing assignments?” Better still, we should all drop the prob-
lematic “doctrinal” and “non-doctrinal” labels, and judge courses by how 
“meaningful” they are in the full senses discussed above.64 Freed from distor-
tions of such problematic terms, we can better grasp the profoundly meaningful 
and modern example of legal writing courses today.65 
                                                        
64  See, e.g., Lloyd, Theory Without Practice, supra note 1, at 78; discussion supra Section 
II.E; supra Section IV. 
65  See generally COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 22 (on objective legal writing); ROCKLIN ET 
AL., supra note 41 (on persuasive legal writing). 
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